Do not take our word for it.

Trust infrastructure that asks to be trusted would be a contradiction. So the rule of the house is that a claim comes with its measurement, a correction is written where the error was and dated, and the tools that check us are published and run by people who are not us. What follows is that rule, made concrete.

What you can verify today

Each item is public, runs without an account at Aere, and says no by name when something does not hold.

• The anchor verifier. Fetches the newest post-quantum anchors of chain 2800, verifies every Falcon-512 and SLH-DSA seal against the published keys and confirms the certificate sits under the block hash. Served from this origin: verify-anchor.mjs; an in-browser edition at verify in the browser.
• The proof verifier (AIP-23). Checks any Aere proof envelope in four levels (form, integrity, signature, finality) and names every refusal: verify-proof.mjs. Notarizations: verify a notarization.
• The verifiable claims file and its checker. verifiable-claims.json lists 17 checkable claims (dated 2026-10-15), each with the call that settles it; verifiable-claims-check.py runs them against the live endpoints and prints PASS or FAIL per claim, trusting nothing in the file but the addresses and the expected values. Repaired on 2026-10-15 after it had failed for everyone on a stale snapshot; that failure is written in its header.
• The security score, every day. A 0 to 100 score computed only from measurements (the findings registry, the measured-facts engine, the live chain, CI), on seven weighted axes, with the formulas published and the unmeasured counted as unmeasured, not as zero: security score.
• The audit status. Written plainly: as of 2026-07-18, and still on 2026-10-15, no external audit has been completed on any Aere contract or client; what was reviewed, by whom and how is on audit status. How to report a vulnerability: bug bounty; the security policy: security.
• Dated corrections, kept where they were made. Fifteen public pages carry a "Corrected" note with the date and the sentence that was wrong; press releases keep their errata beside the original text. Nothing is deleted to look better; the largest one, of 2026-08-19, withdrew the claim that no block finalizes without a post-quantum quorum.

What nobody has checked yet

• No third-party security audit of the contracts, the clients or the four product lines has been published. The external-assurance axis of the score says so every day.
• No independent witnesses of our own verifiers: the tools are open and anyone can run them, but no outside party publishes that it does. The Bitcoin witness through OpenTimestamps covers the quantum shield's record, not every claim.
• No SOC 2, ISO 27001, FIPS 140-3 or Common Criteria certification.
• The ten validators of chain 2800 are run by one operator, the Foundation; the number of independent people who must agree to stop the network is one. It is measured daily and written on the score page.

How the engine is checked

Chain 2800 is the engine under the four lines and the one piece everybody can measure continuously: every 32nd block carries a certificate of post-quantum validator seals under its own hash, the validator set is readable with one call, and the live benchmark and the daily score are recomputed from it. What the engine is and how to run a node of it is at Developers.